What's next for South Africa's foreign policy – Responsible Statecraft

While there are ministers in the new government eager for change, the country’s system is likely to maintain the status quo
South Africa’s new coalition government is likely to leave present foreign policy unchanged, despite awarding six cabinet seats to the center-right Democratic Alliance (DA), which is notably more pro-Western and pro-Israel.
However, new foreign policy initiatives may be more restrained as a result of a clause in the coalition’s declaration of intent that requires agreement between the major parties when new policies arise.
The country’s relationship with the United States will be on their minds next year as its status as a beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act comes up for review amid rising congressional criticism. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed legislation requiring the Biden administration to conduct a full review of the U.S. relationship with South Africa.
Triggered by opposition to Pretoria’s relations with Russia, China, and Iran, it would require the administration to report on whether South Africa “has engaged in activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.” The legislation is unlikely to pass in the Senate.
President Joe Biden told his South African counterpart, President Cyril Ramaphosa, on Tuesday evening that should he win a second term he intends on coming to South Africa for next year’s G20 summit which Ramaphosa will host as G20 chair in 2025, and Ramaphosa invited Biden for a state visit.
Biden called to congratulate Ramaphosa on his re-election and successful formation of a multiparty coalition government after Ramaphosa’s African National Congress (ANC) suffered a severe setback, falling from 57% to 40% in the May 29 poll.
In coalition talks, Ramaphosa successfully prioritized retaining almost all ideologically sensitive ministries, including international relations, defense and intelligence, as well as finance and trade and industy, in the hands of his ANC. He conceded six domestic portfolios out of 32 to the DA, and another six to smaller, ideologically conservative parties for a total of 12.
The newly appointed minister of international relations and cooperation, Ronald Lamola, who is 40, has publicly endorsed the policies of his predecessor, Naledi Pandor, a Muslim and passionate supporter of Palestine, who did not make it back to parliament given the ANC’s election setback.
Unlike Pandor, who spent many years in exile, Lamola is part of a new generation of leaders who stayed in South Africa before liberation. He was 10 when Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first democratic president.
He is likely to maintain Pandor’s policy positions, having worked on the case against Israel at the International Court of Justice in his previous role as justice minister, but he has less experience with international affairs.
The DA and some smaller parties with a seat in the cabinet are likely to moderate the rhetorical tone of South African anti-Western criticism and emphasize South Africa’s important Western export markets for high-value sale of South African cars, wine, and agricultural goods.
The DA and other coalition parties have expressed fear that South Africa’s criticism of Western policies and growing ties with Russia could jeopardize important trade ties.
DA leader John Steenhuisen, now minister of agriculture, travelled to Ukraine early in that war to voice strong support for Ukraine and criticized the government for appearing to be neutral while calling President Vladimir Putin long before it contacted his Ukrainian counterpart.
Steenhuisen’s party has also objected to South Africa downgrading its Israeli embassy, and its decision to withdraw all diplomats from Israel and suspend diplomatic ties in November last year. His party has been less enthusiastic about South Africa’s role in BRICS.
The new government includes two small parties, the pro-Palestinian Al Jamma-ah party, which is not represented in the new cabinet, and the strongly pro-Israel Patriotic Alliance, led by former gangster and bank robber Gayton McKenzie, who is the new minister of sport, arts and culture.
The ANC made foreign policy a significant campaign issue, criticizing opposition parties for failing to speak out against Israel’s incursion into Gaza, but polling indicated that it had little impact on voters, who were guided mostly by domestic concerns in an economy that has not grown through both the nine-year presidency of Jacob Zuma and Ramaphosa’s six years in office.
The coalition government, which the president describes as a government of national unity, was concluded surprisingly fast after the results showed this was the only way to keep out two radical parties which vowed to change the constitution.
Both the ANC and most of its opponents in the DA and other small parties who joined the coalition have a strong incentive to stay together despite seemingly large ideological differences.
While the ANC lost 17% of its support, the DA was not able to capitalize on the ANC’s unpopularity as a result of years of well-publicized corruption, gaining only a single percent to garner 21.81% of the vote.
Both major parties and analysts were stunned at the success of Zuma’s new Mkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP), taking 14.58% in last month’s poll after being established only six months ago.
Combined with the radical Economic Freedom Fighters, with 9.52%, they pose a threat to both the ANC and DA. This was undoubtedly the main reason the DA reversed its historic opposition to working with the ANC, and swallowed its differences and joined the government.
The coalition talks took one month, and included several public spats. One provincial government, Gauteng, home of the country’s commercial capital, Johannesburg, remains in deadlock. The Gauteng ANC, if left to its own devices, would probably have chosen the MKP and EFF as partners over the DA, which has accused them of negotiating in bad faith.
So far the ANC national leadership have stepped in successfully to prevent a complete breakdown in those talks, but however they are resolved, the DA has confirmed that this conflict will not spill over into the national coalition agreement. If they cannot agree, the DA will return to opposition benches in this province. DA ministers were sworn in on Wednesday.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa speaks after being re-elected as president of South Africa during the first sitting of the National Assembly following elections, at the Cape Town International Convention Center (CTICC) in Cape Town, South Africa June 14, 2024. REUTERS/Nic Bothma
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reacts after the ceremonial first pitch throw to celebrate "NATO day" before the start of the game between the Washington Nationals and the St. Louis Cardinals at Nationals Park in Washington, U.S., July 8, 2024. REUTERS/Yves Herman
The heads of state and government of all 32 NATO allies will meet at a summit in Washington, July 9-11, to celebrate the Alliance’s 75th birthday. It was scheduled more than a year ago, but, as the date has approached, it increasingly seems like a bad idea.
Of course, nobody could have foreseen current concerns in the American media and political class of President Joe Biden’s travails stemming from his poor debate performance with Donald Trump on June 27. Unfortunately, that story risks squeezing the summit’s achievements off page one.
In public, the 31 non-U.S. NATO leaders will demonstrate their confidence in Mr. Biden’s leadership, vision, and personal staying power for a second term. But in private, some allied leaders will quietly whisper misgivings into the prying ears of the hordes of media hovering at the fringes of the official meetings. This is to be expected, although, faced with a choice, there is overwhelming preference among allied leaders for Mr. Biden as president next year rather than Trump, who has at times been viewed as less than committed to a strong NATO.
Holding a NATO summit now is also unfortunate for a reason directly related to alliance business. Dominating the agenda is the continuing war in Ukraine. There is much to be considered, especially the quantity and quality of allies‘ support for Ukraine’s war effort against Russia’s aggression. Led by the United States, the allies must continue making careful calculations about the nature of military support for Ukraine, especially the capacity to strike targets in Russia — although at the summit, these discussions will likely occur “off line” rather than in plenary sessions.
Discussion of the Ukraine War will be constrained by several factors, one is that not all the Western allies are convinced that they should put their own security on the line for Ukraine, especially if this means an increased possibility of a direct Russian attack on an allied state — or threats such as cyber attack, which have already begun. At the extreme, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, spent the past few days meeting with Vladimir Putin, thus appearing to thumb his nose at NATO’s support for Kyiv. Some allies even worry about Putin’s threat to escalate to nuclear use, even though this is most unlikely, given that it would mean Russia’s risking mutual suicide.
Further, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has regularly declared that his country’s goal is “victory” which he has defined as regaining on the battlefield not just lands Russia occupied since its 2022 invasion, but also territories, including Crimea, that it seized in 2014. No serious person believes that this is possible. But it is impolitic to say so while Ukraine is fighting for its life. It will be hard for the allies at the Washington summit not to endorse Ukraine’s goal of victory, however ill-defined.
It will also be impolitic for the NATO summit to discuss possible negotiations with Russia on the war. That will have to be done at another venue at another time. Then, there will be debate about the “when and how” to enter into negotiations to try to end the war — for Ukraine, on terms that it can accept; but, like it or not, the “whether” of negotiations with Russia at some point is unavoidable.
Otherwise, the war will just continue, with massive killing and physical destruction, to no apparent end. But this issue will not be touched at the summit, lest there appear to be any breaking of ranks with Kyiv. An added complication is that, while negotiations to end the war could not take place without Ukraine’s involvement, any outcome would need to be agreed and underwritten by the only powers that ultimately count, the United States and Russia.
Discussion of the Ukraine War will be further complicated at the summit by a strategic mistake NATO made at its 2008 Bucharest summit, when it proclaimed that Ukraine (and Georgia) ”will become members of NATO.” That seemed harmless enough, but not to Russia. It would be as though the West were to accept that Ukraine would become a Kremlin satrapy. But instead of recognizing its mistake, NATO, under U.S. prodding, has continued ritually to repeat the formulation and will no doubt do so again at the Washington summit, as fealty to Ukrainian desires.
Yet in addition to flying in the face of geopolitical reality — that Ukraine, while a Western-oriented democracy, is a natural buffer state — the commitment to its eventual NATO membership plays into the hands of Mr. Putin, who has his own constituency to answer to, particularly in light of horrendous Russian as well as Ukrainian battlefield losses.
Further, the commitment is quite useless. Not only does it provide no immediate and practical benefit to Ukraine, but it would never be honored. It is virtually inconceivable that, at any point, all 32 NATO allies would join the consensus required for any country to enter the Alliance, with the commitment that “an armed attack against one or more [allies]… shall be considered an attack against them all.”
The summit’s Ukraine agenda also involves NATO’s overall military and related capabilities. Here, there is good news for the Alliance’s requirements. Most important are the last few year’s enormous advances in allied military efforts, organization, deployments, and preparedness for potential conflict. Efforts for the future are also on track and the summit will review them in detail.
Further, the Alliance is making progress on the target agreed at its 2014 summit that each ally should spend at least two percent of its gross domestic product on defense. That target was only roughly a measure of military capacity, however — indeed, the raw number is about inputs (money) rather than outputs (effectiveness), a more relevant measure. And the intended audience for that target was as much the U.S. Congress with its inveterate demand that the European allies assume more of common burdens — as Congress is again doing over the Ukraine War — as it was Russia, which had just taken Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.
Indeed, NATO has recently announced that 23 of the 32 allies have now met the two percent target (though what Congress will make of the nine laggards is not yet clear). In one bright spot for American bipartisanship, both Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump have taken credit for the increase in the number of allies that are now meeting the target.
A last “untouchable” issue for the summit is what to do about Russia in the future. Geopolitical facts are what they are: Russia will not be destroyed, it remains a looming presence whoever is in power in the Kremlin, and at some point the West will need to try configuring overall European security with Russia as active participant.
As of now, despite his rhetoric, Mr. Putin is unlikely to be interested in serious negotiations, either on Ukraine or on broader European security. Thus at the summit, allied leaders will steer clear of this matter, too, although it is of critical importance (despite many American commentators’ having already proclaimed “Cold War II” with Russia).
Ironically, the aspiration of including Russia in European security arrangements, as a geopolitical necessity, was formulated by President George H. W. Bush in May 1989 and followed by President Bill Clinton: to try creating a “Europe whole and free” and at peace. In the 1990s, there were efforts to work effectively with Russia, notably the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. But by the early 2000s, cooperation went off the rails. This was due in part to Mr. Putin’s ambition to regain at least some of the lost Soviet territories.
But it also resulted from the view of a succession of U.S. policymakers that Russia would remain a second-rate power whose interests could be largely ignored — a miscalculation of historical proportions. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, this underlying and unavoidable strategic concern will be postponed to some indefinite future time.
Photo: Shutterstock/Ben Von Klemperer
NATO likes to present itself as “the most successful alliance in history,” not because it was successful in war, but because it prevented war, and also simply because it has lasted far longer than most alliances.
What this propaganda narrative, however, obscures is that NATO during the Cold War avoided actual war not just by deterring the Soviet Union, but by eschewing actions of its own that would have led to war.
The only ground war in which NATO has ever been involved, in Afghanistan, ended in disastrous failure. The U.S. military’s view of its European allies in Afghanistan, and indeed, a central feature of NATO itself, was pithily summed up for me by a U.S. officer in Kabul: “They pretend to fight, and we pretend to listen to them.”
During the 75 years of NATO’s existence, there really have been three NATOs: two with the mission of containing Russia, separated by one which thrashed around wildly and disastrously in search of a new mission. NATO I achieved a complete but peaceful victory when the Soviet bloc collapsed from within — though this came as a result above all of Communism’s own failed promise.
NATO II threw away the fruits of this victory through a disastrous kind of frivolous megalomaniac dilettantism. It thereby helped to usher in NATO III, whose eventual fate remains uncertain.
Key to understanding the role and the success of NATO I (1949-1989) is that it operated only in Europe, and in accordance with George Kennan’s original conception of containment. That is to say, it set out to prevent further Soviet military expansion in Europe, and to provide a military shield behind which western European countries could develop as successful economic and political systems.
Their success in this regard, compared to the manifest failure of Soviet Communism, eventually brought about the Soviet bloc’s collapse from within, just as Kennan had foretold. NATO thereby also helped the U.S. to retain access to European markets, hegemony over the eastern littoral of the Atlantic Ocean, and ideological and cultural prestige as the leader of the “Free World.”
When NATO was formed, and for many years thereafter, several of its European members were engaged in ferocious wars in Asia and Africa in an attempt to retain some portion of their colonial empires. NATO, however, was not involved in these wars, nor in the U.S. war in Indochina and other Washington-backed anti-communist operations around the world.
Above all, NATO I and (after a brief wobble) the U.S. itself, eschewed ideas of “rollback,” the attempt to drive the Soviet Union out of eastern Europe through the fomentation of revolutions backed by NATO military force. Three moments were critical in this regard: the disastrous failure of the American and British attempt to overthrow the Communist government of Albania through a royalist rebellion assisted by U.S. and British special forces officers (Operations “Fiend” and “Valuable,” 1946-49, which cost around 300 American and British agents their lives).
The second was Stalin’s withdrawal of support for the Communist side in the Greek Civil War, and third, President Eisenhower’s decision (ratified by the Solarium Exercise in 1953) to oppose rollback in Europe and stick to containment.
The Soviet Union too, though it suppressed anti-Soviet revolutions in eastern Europe, and backed anti-Western revolutions elsewhere in the world, was careful not to initiate or provoke military conflict in Europe itself. Behind this mutual caution lay the mutual recognition that their positions in Europe (unlike in Africa or Asia) involved the vital interests of both sides, and that if these were seriously threatened this would mean war, most probably escalating to nuclear war and mutual annihilation.
With the end of the Cold War, this NATO prudence evaporated. The Soviet collapse was seen as the unconditional triumph of the West. The resulting “End of History” mentality led to strategic and ideological hubris, which then combined to disastrous effect with other factors. Among these, the newly independent east European states (and their lobbies in the U.S.), obsessed with fear of Russia, clamored for membership.
Somewhat paradoxically, this took place at a time when Russia was so weak that Moscow’s concerns and reactions were treated as unimportant. In 1995, a senior German diplomat in Moscow told me that Russian fears were irrational, “because NATO is not what it was during the Cold War. It has changed.” I asked him what it had changed into. “We are still deciding that,” he replied. When made to Russians, such statements began the process of alienation that culminated in the Ukraine War.
The NATO organization itself of course, like any great bureaucratic institution, was obsessed above all with finding reasons for its own survival on which so many military, bureaucratic and academic jobs in Europe depended. The almost unanimous opposition to NATO expansion among serious Russia experts (including Kennan himself) was simply brushed aside. Many, when they saw the struggle as hopeless, became silent or went over to support.
As Russians warned, the expansion of NATO (and the EU) to eastern Europe brought into the alliance nations with a deeply ingrained fear and hatred of Russia. These Russian warnings were dismissed with the argument that once their security was guaranteed by NATO membership, this fear and hostility would disappear. Nothing of the sort happened. Instead, these sentiments fused with NATO’s built-in structural hostility to Russia inherited from the Cold War.
Some effort was made to convince Moscow that NATO expansion would be combined with cooperation with Russia, above all through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. In practice, however, this institution proved almost completely meaningless, for all the NATO members formed a bloc under U.S. guidance, and instead of negotiating, simply overruled Russia whenever there was a point of disagreement.
With the solitary exception of the invasion of Iraq — which Germany, France and most other NATO members opposed — NATO countries refused publicly to align with Moscow against Washington even on issues where they were in fact in deep disagreement with Washington policy. The George W. Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 was one example.
The promise of NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 was another, far more disastrous case where West European opposition bowed (albeit in qualified fashion) to U.S. dictation. It brought NATO into direct confrontation with Russia’s determination to maintain a sphere of influence and security zone in its immediate neighborhood, in areas where the Soviet collapse (as with the end of most empires) had left behind actual or potential ethnic and territorial conflicts.
And yet at the same time, NATO nor its individual members, had a plan or actual desire to fight Russia. Repeated warnings that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia would mean war were literally laughed away by Western diplomats. As a former officer attached to the NATO Secretariat told me, the Secretariat did not even discuss contingency plans for a war between Georgia and Russia after — on U.S. orders — it threw its weight behind NATO membership for that country.
As he explained, NATO expansion had been sold to Western parliaments and publics on the premise that it would involve no costs and no risks. Even to discuss the possibility of war was therefore taboo. As a result, NATO’s European members acquiesced in a program of expansion that they had been warned repeatedly would lead to war, while making no preparation for war, and continuing to rely for energy on imports of cheap Russian gas.
NATO III now finds itself in something that it, and its American hegemon, were careful to avoid during the first Cold War: a proxy conflict with Russia not in Asia or Africa, but in Europe itself, and in circumstances that in the long run strongly favor Russia.
The resulting (largely imaginary) perception of a Russian threat to western and central Europe has in turn led to even deeper European dependence on the U.S., leading to growing alignment against China, and acquiescence in Israel’s U.S.-enabled crimes in Gaza.
The threat of climate change, which is already having a savage effect on NATO’s southern European members and has been described by the alliance as “existential,” has virtually disappeared from NATO’s real agenda. And while during the first Cold War, the vast superiority of the West’s social, political, and economic systems became completely obvious, today these are all deeply troubled by internal factors exacerbated by migration and neo-liberal economic policies.
Assuming that we have any descendants, they are likely to view us as we do the European elites before 1914: trapped by their inherited culture and institutions, they pursued policies that seemed rational to them, but in retrospect look completely insane.
Members of Afghanistan's delegation, led by the Taliban-run government's Acting Labour and Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hanan Omari, attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov
Late last month, roughly two dozen countries sent envoys to Qatar for a conference about international engagement with Afghanistan and for the first time the Taliban participated too.
Taliban representatives attended the latest round of the “Doha process” because, unlike the May 2023 gathering, activists were not in attendance this time around. This conference gave the Taliban the chance to call on the U.S. and other western governments to lift economic sanctions on Afghanistan and build deeper ties with the Islamist regime in Kabul.
That diplomats from these roughly two dozen countries and Taliban officials attended this recent conference speaks to the fact that more states are engaging the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), even if no government has officially recognized the Taliban since it reconquered the country in August 2021.
Most of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors and a host of non-western, Muslim-majority countries along with China and Russia have essentially informally recognized the Taliban and stepped up outreach to the IEA to further their own economic, trade, and security interests.


Against this backdrop of growing international engagement with the Taliban, Afghanistan’s economy is in horrible shape. As of March, 69% of Afghanistan’s population is “subsistence insecure” and “dramatic” water scarcity plagues many parts of the country, according to a UN official.

The Afghan economy has contracted by 27% since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. Unemployment has doubled, and only 40% of the Afghan population enjoys access to electricity, while the country’s financial sector has “basically collapsed.”
The Taliban’s governance and extreme policies that limit women’s rights have greatly contributed to these problems. But there is no denying that much of the blame for Afghanistan’s economic crises can be laid on Washington’s doorstep given the sanctions it has imposed on the country since the Taliban retook power almost three years ago.
Despite waging financial warfare against post-occupation Afghanistan, the Biden administration has been engaged with the IEA diplomatically since before the U.S. withdrawal in 2021.
Since the Obama years, Doha has been the main venue for U.S.-Taliban dialogue and engagement. To this day, Qatar’s foreign ministry remains the chief interlocutor between Washington and the Taliban. To lesser degrees, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Norway, and the United Nations serve bridging roles too.
Throughout the past roughly three years, the U.S. and Taliban have engaged on a host of issues such as the mutually perceived threat of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the status of American citizens detained in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, rights of women and girls, and humanitarian challenges in post-U.S. Afghanistan.
The extent to which such engagement with the de facto rulers of Kabul has advanced Washington’s interests is mixed. With respect to the status of Afghanistan’s women and girls, Washington’s diplomatic outreach to the Taliban has basically achieved nothing. At the same time, the Biden administration’s efforts to convince the Taliban to protect certain segments of the Afghan population from the IEA’s oppressive hand have proven futile.
“The U.S. has also failed to convince the Taliban not to target former Afghan government officials, former Afghan National Defense and Security Force members, and millions of those Afghans who were educated under the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan,” Ahmad Sayer Daudzai, the former Afghan ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, told RS.
“This is important for the U.S., as the U.S. considers this generation of Afghans as a long-term asset of the U.S. in Afghanistan. As the Taliban continue to target, arrest, assassinate and force this segment of Afghan society to emigrate from Afghanistan, the U.S. is losing their 20-year gains in Afghanistan,” he added.
But since August 2021, diplomacy has resulted in the release of four U.S. citizens who were held in the Taliban’s prison system. According to U.S. government sources, and it has also led to some productive counterterrorism coordination.
“There is cooperation between the U.S. and the Taliban’s Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, which has allegedly led to successful raids against ISKP in eastern Afghanistan. The details of this financial and intelligence cooperation were declassified [in June 2024] by a CIA veteran of Afghanistan named Sarah Adams,” explained Daudzai.
In the longer-term, great power competition is the key variable in the equation that incentivizes the Biden administration to engage the IEA through diplomacy.
Put simply, the White House understands that if the U.S. does not engage the Taliban at all, Washington’s foes and rivals — Russia, China, and Iran — will move to fill vacuums in post-occupation Afghanistan at the expense of America’s interests in West Asia. This dynamic helps explain in part the rationale behind the Biden administration’s outreach to the IEA despite the humiliation of doing so.
A concern for U.S. policymakers is that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran could bring Taliban-governed Afghanistan increasingly into their orbits of influence. One example pertains to trade and sanctions. Currently, China’s over-land trade with Iran has to transit Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. But, if there is greater stability in Afghanistan, such Sino-Iranian trade could go through one country (Afghanistan) rather than three Central Asian countries, serving to increase geo-economic connectivity between China and Iran.
The reality on the ground in Afghanistan is that no actor poses any credible challenge to the IEA’s rule. ISKP is the most serious threat to the Taliban government today, but this extremist group is unlikely to establish any statelet within Afghanistan (as other Islamic State franchises did in Libya, Iraq, and Syria) — let alone topple the IEA and take control of Afghanistan. Nor is the National Resistance Front in a position to take over.

Therefore, the Taliban’s control of the country is probably set to remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future. Washington not recognizing the Taliban while imposing sanctions on Afghanistan is unlikely to change that. Those in the U.S. who see the world through the lens of great power competition may find themselves challenging the wisdom of not recognizing the Taliban while Washington’s competitors make moves to establish deeper informal (and perhaps before long formal) relationships with the de facto regime in Kabul.
The U.S. recognizing the IEA would be the Taliban’s dream. But that’s a dream which probably would only come true in the distant future. Given Washington’s struggles in Afghanistan since 2001 and the way in which the IEA took power in 2021, any push for recognition of the Taliban would be extremely unpopular in Washington.
However, it would be worth having a serious debate about where Washington’s policy of non-recognition and economic sanctions is headed, and what U.S. interests can be realistically advanced through it.

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©2024 Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
©2024 Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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